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INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Upon taking office in January 2009, one of President Obama’s first official acts 
was to issue an executive order requiring that all persons detained by the United States be 
treated humanely, and that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) close all of its 
detention facilities.1 Together with another executive order directing the closure of the 
detention facility at Guantánamo Bay,2 this order marks the beginning of the end of a 
controversial chapter of American counterterrorism policy.  
¶2 At this time, the beginning of a new presidency, it is instructive to look back at the 
period just past, a period in which torture and coercion were openly sanctioned as tools of 
interrogation at the highest levels of the Bush administration.3 This article is about the 
normalization of interrogational torture and coercion from 2001 to 2008. In particular, the 
discussion focuses on a key device in the normalization process: the ticking bomb 
scenario. Long a philosophy professor’s staple, the ticking bomb scenario post-9/11 
received renewed attention from legal academics, who have invoked it in questioning the 
status of the absolute legal prohibition on torture. Versions of the ticking bomb scenario 
have also appeared in Bush administration documents and official statements that 
asserted the legality of torture and various coercive interrogation techniques. 
Additionally, the scenario has been replicated in the media and popular culture, the most 
notable example being Fox’s high-rating television show, 24. Together, these various 
manifestations of the ticking bomb scenario constitute the first narrative or account of 
torture. 
¶3 However, this narrative has been contested by a second account of torture that 
challenges the logic of the ticking bomb scenario. Academic commentators have 
highlighted the assumptions underlying the scenario that render it a suspect guide to 
policy. Certain government actors, most notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and military lawyers, consistently rejected its logic, and opposed the use of torture 
and coercion in interrogation. This second account also has a popular culture 
                                                 
* Faculty of Law, University of Auckland, New Zealand. My thanks to An Hertogen and Kevin Jon Heller, 
for their comments on earlier drafts. Any errors remain my own. 
1 Exec. Order No. 13,491, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1885.pdf. 
2 Exec. Order No. 13,492, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval 
Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at 
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1893.pdf. See also Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Helene 
Cooper, Obama Reverses Key Bush Policy, but Questions on Detainees Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, 
at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/23/us/politics/23obama.html?_r=1. 
3 This typically involved an official admission that a particular coercive interrogation technique had been 
used, while at the same time denying that the use of that technique amounted to torture. This pattern of 
admission and denial is illustrated by the Bush administration’s defense of waterboarding. See infra text 
accompanying notes 84-85.  
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representative in the form of Sci-Fi Channel’s Battlestar Galactica. Thus, the same battles 
that have been fought over the treatment of detainees in the “war on terror” in the legal 
and political arenas by real world actors in the years since 9/11 have also been fought at a 
discursive level in popular culture.  
¶4 The article begins in Part I by laying out the law in relation to torture. The law in 
this area is clear: torture and various other forms of mistreatment are illegal. However, 
soon after 9/11, there were calls to loosen the reins and allow counterterrorist agencies 
greater flexibility. Parts II and III discuss the two narratives of torture identified above, 
and particularly their appearances in academic literature, official discourse, and popular 
culture. If the previous two parts consider how art has imitated life, Part IV deals with 
how life has imitated art. The popular culture representatives of each narrative, 24 and 
Battlestar Galactica, are reflections of post-9/11 American society. At the same time, 
both shows have the potential to shape and influence the debate about torture in the 
United States. 24, in particular, being representative of the dominant or hegemonic 
narrative of torture during the period under consideration, has already done this in several 
different ways. 
I. THE NEW NORMAL 
¶5 The prohibition on torture features prominently in international law. It is widely 
accepted as a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens).4 The right to be free 
from torture can also be found in numerous human rights treaties. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, states that “[n]o one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”5 The 
Covenant permits derogation from certain rights during exceptional situations of 
emergency, but the right to be free from torture is not one of these rights.6 The 
Convention against Torture (CAT) further clarifies this point in unequivocal terms: “No 
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal 
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of 
torture.”7 The CAT, in addition to prohibiting torture,8 also obliges states to take 
measures to prevent acts, which, although falling short of the threshold for torture, 
nevertheless amount to “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”9  
¶6 The law of armed conflict protects against torture and coercion as well. The 
prohibition on torture here can be found as far back as the Lieber Code of 1863.10 It also 
                                                 
4 See A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (No. 2) [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221, paras. 33-34. 
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
ICCPR], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm. 
6 Id. art. 4.  
7 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, 
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. 
8 CAT defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or 
a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of 
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.  It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.” Id. art. 1. 
9 Id. art. 16. 
10 See Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, Gen. Order No. 100 
Vol. 7:1] John Ip 
 37
finds expression in the more recent Geneva Conventions. For example, article 17 of the 
Third Geneva Convention states, “No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of 
coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any 
kind whatsoever.”11 It further states that prisoners of war who refuse to answer questions 
“may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous 
treatment of any kind.”12 Article 31 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that “[n]o 
physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to 
obtain information from them or from third parties.”13 Both the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions explicitly state that torture is a grave breach of the Conventions.14 
Additionally, common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which appears in all four 
Conventions, protects against “violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.”15 Finally, Article 75 of Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which applies as a backstop to detainees who are 
not entitled to more favorable treatment under the Conventions or the Protocol, prohibits 
“torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental.”16 
¶7 In terms of domestic law, the prohibition on the infliction of torture has long been 
considered a touchstone of the common law.17 Torture is plainly prohibited under 
American law as well. The general criminal law would apply to acts amounting to torture 
committed inside the United States.18 Further, the Torture Statute, enacted by Congress in 
order to implement obligations under CAT, criminalizes acts of torture committed outside 
the United States.19 Moreover, prior to changes wrought by the Military Commissions 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Apr. 24, 1863), art. 16, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp. 
11 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 17, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GCIII]. 
12 Id. 
13 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 31, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3516, 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 308. 
14 See id. art. 147; GCIII, supra note 11, art. 130.  
15 GCIII, supra note 11, art. 3. Although applicable on its terms to “armed conflict not of an international 
character,” common article 3 also states the minimum protection applicable to international armed conflicts 
as a matter of customary international law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113-15, paras. 218-20 (June 27); see also George H. Aldrich, 
The Laws of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT‘L L. 42, 60 (2000); Adam Roberts, The Laws of War in the War 
on Terror, 32 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS 193, 230 (2002). 
16 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 
1391 [hereinafter Protocol I]. Although the United States has not ratified the two Additional Protocols of 
1977, article 75 of Protocol I is applicable as the United States accepts that it is declaratory of customary 
international law. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006) (citing William H. Taft IV, The Law 
of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 322 (2003)). 
17 See Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t (No. 2) [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221, para. 11 (“[F]rom 
its earliest days the common law of England set its face firmly against the use of torture.”). 
18 Michael Garcia, U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT): Overview and Application to Interrogation 
Techniques, CRS Rep. for Congress, at CRS-8 (Jan. 26, 2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL32438.pdf. 
19 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2000): 
§ 2340. Definitions 
As used in this chapter-- 
  (1) “torture” means an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another 
person within his custody or physical control; 
  (2) “severe mental pain or suffering” means the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from— 
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Act of 2006,20 the War Crimes Act of 1996 made it a serious criminal offense for anyone, 
whether inside or outside the United States, to commit either grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions or breaches of common article 3.21 
¶8 This impressive edifice of legal prohibitions came under pressure soon after the 
September 11 attacks as the notion that “9/11 changed everything” gradually became 
conventional wisdom.22 In this new reality, basic commitments to certain values, even the 
right to be free from torture and coercion, were called into question. In the face of an 
apparently novel societal threat, adherence to the old rules was seen as being 
characteristic of a naïve pre-9/11 mindset. And thus, what was previously unthinkable 
was no longer so: torture and its close cousins would once again be on the discussion 
table as an instrument of state. This change was exemplified by Vice President Cheney, 
                                                                                                                                                 
    (A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; 
    (B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances 
or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; 
    (C) the threat of imminent death; or 
    (D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or 
the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the 
senses or personality; and 
  (3) “United States” means the several States of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the 
commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the United States. 
 
§ 2340A. Torture 
  (a) Offense.--Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this 
subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 
  (b) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction over the activity prohibited in subsection (a) if-- 
    (1) the alleged offender is a national of the United States; or 
    (2) the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality of the victim or alleged 
offender. 
  (c) Conspiracy.--A person who conspires to commit an offense under this section shall be subject to the same 
penalties (other than the penalty of death) as the penalties prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the 
object of the conspiracy. 
 
The definition of torture in the Torture Statute is narrower than that of CAT. This reflects the reservations, 
understandings and declarations attached by the Senate during the ratification process. See U.S. Reservations, 
Declarations, and Understandings, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 136 Cong. Rec. S17,486-01 (1990), also available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/cat/treaties/convention-reserv.htm. The flexibility afforded by the Torture 
Statute’s narrower definition was later exploited by the Bush administration. See infra text accompanying notes 62-69. 
See also John T. Parry, Torture Nation, Torture Law, 97 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 54), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1265124. 
20 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2601-02 (codified at 10 U.S.C. 
§948a). 
21 War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §2441 (2000). The Military Commissions Act narrowed the War Crimes 
Act’s coverage from breaches of common article 3 to specified “grave” breaches of common article 3. See 
James G. Stewart, The Military Commissions Act’s Inconsistency with the Geneva Conventions: An 
Overview, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 26, 33 (2005). 
22 Vice President Richard Cheney, Remarks at McChord Air Force Base (Dec. 22, 2003), transcript 
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031223-1.html (“In a 
sense, 9/11 changed everything for us.”); President George W. Bush, Press Conference (Sept. 23, 2004), 
transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040923-
8.html (“See, 9/11 changed everything.”); see also Daniel Henninger, Wonder Land: 20th Century Rules 
Will Not Win A 21st Century War, WALL S. J., Apr. 7, 2006, at A12. 
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who ominously spoke of “hav[ing] to work . . . sort of the dark side” soon after the 
attacks.23  
¶9 Those closer to the counterterrorism coalface seemed to take this tough talk from 
above to heart. As one anonymous official involved in the capture and transfer of terrorist 
detainees stated, “If you don’t violate someone’s human rights some of the time, you 
probably aren’t doing your job.”24 The same official also opined that the CIA had for too 
long promoted a “view of zero tolerance” on torture.25 Cofer Black, Director of the CIA’s 
Counterterrorist Center from 1999 until 2002, summed up this brave new world of 
interrogation in his Congressional testimony: “All I want to say is that there was ‘before 
9/11’ and ‘after 9/11’. After 9/11 the gloves came off.”26  
¶10 The end result was that torture and coercion became acceptable or at least tolerable 
to some degree. As John Parry suggests, elite opposition to the excesses of American 
counterterrorism policy, particularly in relation to the (mis)treatment of detainees, did not 
translate into similar opposition from the general public.27 David Luban agrees, observing 
a new tolerance for torture, at least when inflicted on terrorists.28 He notes the lack of 
public outrage upon the disclosure of the CIA’s torturing of high-value al Qaeda 
detainees, and the disinterest of the American media in the torture of al Qaeda leader 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the disappearing of his two sons.29 Even official 
admissions in 2008 that the United States had subjected three high-value detainees to a 
form of torture known as waterboarding met with a similarly apathetic public response.30 
This state of affairs was encapsulated by Mark Danner’s 2005 remark: “[t]he system of 
torture has . . . survived its disclosure.”31  
                                                 
23 Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2001) (remarks of Vice President Richard Cheney), 
transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-
speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html. 
24 Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST,  
Dec. 26, 2002, at A01. 
25 Id. 
26 Mark Bowden, The Dark Art of Interrogation, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2003, at 56. 
27 John T. Parry, ‘Just for Fun’: Understanding Torture and Understanding Abu Ghraib, 1 J. NAT'L SEC. L. 
& POL'Y 253, 282 (2005). 
28 David Luban, Unthinking the Ticking Bomb 2-3 (Georgetown Public Law Research Paper No. 1154202), 
available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154202 (“[T]he American public has become decidedly tolerant of 
torture, provided that the subjects are described as terrorists.”); see also Will Lester, Most Say Torture OK 
in Rare Cases, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/12/06/AR2005120600110.html (noting that 61 percent of Americans surveyed 
agreed that torture was justified at least on rare occasions; by comparison, almost 90 percent of respondents 
in South Korea and about half of respondents in France and Britain agreed). 
29 Luban, supra note 28, at 3. 
30 See Richard Esposito & Jason Ryan, CIA Chief: We Waterboarded, ABC NEWS, Feb. 5, 2008,  
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=4244423; Poll results: Waterboarding is Torture, CNN.COM, Nov. 6, 2007, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/11/06/waterboard.poll/index.html (noting that 69 percent of 
respondents agreed that waterboarding was a form of torture, and that 40 percent of respondents agreed that 
the U.S. government should be allowed to use waterboarding for interrogation) (last visited Apr. 1, 2009). 
See generally Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468 (2007). 
31 Mark Danner, We Are All Torturers Now, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 6, 2005, at A27. 
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II. ART IMITATES LIFE: TICKING BOMBS AND 24 
¶11 At the heart of the rise of this tolerance for torture was the ticking bomb scenario. 
Typically, this scenario posits that terrorists have planted a bomb in a major city that is 
due to detonate in a relatively short and finite period of time. If the bomb explodes, a 
large number of people will be killed. Authorities have, however, captured one of the 
terrorists, who has critical information that would allow authorities to defuse the bomb. 
The terrorist, however, refuses to talk, leaving the interrogator with the unenviable choice 
of either allowing the bomb to explode or obtaining the information through torture.  
¶12 The ticking bomb scenario is, as Luban observes, “a remarkably effective 
propaganda device. . . . [I]t is simple, easy to grasp, emotionally powerful, and—above 
all—it seems to have only one right answer, the pro-torture answer.”32 In addition to its 
one-sidedness, the ticking bomb scenario is pervasive in discussions about torture and 
coercion:33  
It is a remarkable fact that everyone argues the pros and cons of torture 
through the ticking time bomb. Senator Schumer and Professor 
Dershowitz, the Israeli Supreme Court, indeed every journalist devoting a 
think-piece to the unpleasant question of torture, begins with the ticking 
time bomb and ends there as well.34 
¶13 The ticking bomb scenario’s ubiquity extends to academic discussions about 
torture, as well as documents and official statements from the Bush administration 
concerning the interrogation of terrorist suspects. It is also the leitmotif of Fox’s 
counterterrorism drama, 24. These varied sources constitute a consistent narrative about 
torture centered on the ticking bomb. The underlying message is clear: torture is an 
effective and sometimes necessary tool for extracting crucial, lifesaving information. 
A.  The academic debate over torture and the ticking bomb  
¶14 The debate here has generally not been whether torture is an evil, but whether, in 
spite of this, torture could under certain circumstances be a necessary or lesser evil.35 
Invariably, the device used to dislodge all but a hardy few deontologists from the 
absolutist no-torture-ever position was the ticking bomb scenario.  
¶15 The use of the ticking bomb scenario in the context of torture was not entirely new. 
Jeremy Bentham constructed a version of it in the early nineteenth century.36 Michael 
Walzer discussed it in 1973.37 It also appeared in several law review articles written 
                                                 
32 Luban, supra note 28, at 4. 
33 Id. 
34 David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 35, 44 
(Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006). 
35 For a useful description of the debate, see Sherry F. Colb, Why is Torture 'Different' and How 'Different' 
is it?  7-14 (Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 08-171), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1099061. 
36 See W. L. Twining & P. E. Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 N. IR. L. Q. 305, 347 (1973). 
37 Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 160, 167 
(1973). 
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before the September 11 attacks.38 But after 9/11, the ticking bomb scenario acquired a 
new salience. Journalists began posing the ticking bomb scenario in discussions about 
whether torture should now be permissible.39 The academic debate followed suit. Faced 
with the scenario, few academic commentators maintained the position that torture should 
be prohibited absolutely and under all circumstances.40 Most argued that torture could be 
justified in certain exceptional circumstances. However, there were differing views as to 
what this entailed for the interrogator in the ticking bomb scenario and for the absolute 
legal prohibition on torture. Some adhered to the absolute legal prohibition for pragmatic 
reasons, and found some ex post means of dealing with the interrogator faced with a 
ticking bomb.41 Parry, for example, argues that an interrogator who had truly resorted to 
torture as a last resort to save lives would have access to the criminal law defense of 
necessity.42 Oren Gross, the foremost exponent of this view, advocates official 
disobedience and, where appropriate, ex post ratification. Thus, an interrogator who 
tortured would violate the law, but it would then be up to society to decide how to 
respond. The interrogator might be subject to sanction if society regarded the 
interrogator’s action as unjustifiable or inexcusable. Conversely, societal ratification 
might occur by utilizing measures such as prosecutorial discretion, jury nullification, or 
executive clemency.43 
¶16 Others, seeking to de-moralize the issue of torture, were less attached to the 
absolute legal prohibition on torture, and advocated a more transparent ex ante approach 
that accommodated a ticking bomb situation. This included the most notable academic 
proponent for the use of torture since September 11, Alan Dershowitz.44 Dershowitz 
                                                 
38 See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Torture, The State and the Individual, 23 ISR. L. REV. 345, 345 (1989); 
Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REV. 280, 333-34 (1989); Winfried 
Brugger, May Government Ever Use Torture? Two Responses From German Law, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 661, 
677 (2000). See also Gunter Frankenberg, Torture and Taboo: An Essay Comparing Paradigms of 
Organized Cruelty, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 403, 404-5 (2008) (noting various discussions of torture in German 
legal literature before September 11, 2001). 
39 Vicki Haddock, The Unspeakable, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 18, 2001, at D1 (“The strongest argument for 
rougher interrogations of those now custody [sic] is that getting them to talk, by whatever means, might foil 
future attacks—possibly even a cataclysmic assault with a biochemical weapon or radioactive ‘dirty bomb’ 
that could kill tens of thousands of Americans.”); Jonathan Alter, Time to Think About Torture, 
NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/76304 (“Israeli law leaves a little 
room for ‘moderate physical pressure’ in what are called ‘ticking time bomb’ cases, where extracting 
information is essential to saving hundreds of lives.”). See also Jim Rutenberg, Torture Seeps Into 
Discussion By News Media, N.Y. TIMES, Nov 5, 2001, at C1. 
40 Henry Shue, Torture in Dreamland: Disposing of the Ticking Bomb, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.  231, 
238-39 (2006) (“So I now take the most moderate position on torture, the position nearest to the middle of 
the road, feasible in the real world: never again. Never, ever, exactly as international law indisputably 
requires.”); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence and the White House, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1681, 1714-15 (2005) (“Might we be willing to allow the authorization of torture at least in a 
‘ticking bomb’ case . . . ? For what it is worth, my own answer to this question is a simple ‘No.’ I draw the 
line at torture.”). See also Ariel Dorfman, The Tyranny of Terror: Is Torture Inevitable in Our Century and 
Beyond?, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 3 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004). 
41 See John T. Parry, Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and Abroad, in TORTURE: A 
COLLECTION 145 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); Oren Gross, The Prohibition on Torture and the Limits of 
the Law, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 229 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); Kadish, supra note 38. 
42 Parry, supra note 41, at 158. 
43 Gross, supra note 41, at 240-41. 
44 ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS (2002). Dershowitz also sets out his position on torture 
in various newspaper columns. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Is There a Torturous Road to Justice?, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, available at http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith//courses01/rrtw/Dershowitz.htm 
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argues that since torture sometimes works, the use of torture in interrogation is a moral 
dilemma that must be faced.45 Dershowitz accepts that in the case of a ticking bomb 
torture is justified on utilitarian grounds: “[I]t is surely better to inflict nonlethal pain on 
one guilty terrorist than to permit a large number of victims to die.”46 His suggested 
methods for inflicting pain are a sterilized needle under the fingernails, or a dental drill 
into an unanaesthetized tooth.47  
¶17 Dershowitz further suggests that the infliction of pain should be regulated by a 
system of judicial warrants in order to minimize the instances of torture. Under this 
system, an executive official would present evidence to a judge that a suspect had 
information needed to thwart an impending terrorist attack. Assuming that the judge 
granted the warrant, the suspect would then be granted immunity and told that he was 
compelled to testify. If the suspect refused, he would then be threatened with torture, and 
if necessary, subjected to non-lethal torture, as authorized by the warrant.48 Dershowitz 
contends that torture is inevitable in a ticking bomb situation; the only question is 
whether it is going to be done openly or secretly and illegally.49  His position is that his 
system of judicial torture warrants will enhance the transparency and accountability of 
torture, and therefore limit its occurrence to truly exceptional cases.50  
¶18 Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke go further than Dershowitz, who is opposed to 
torture as a general moral matter.51 They argue that “torture is indeed morally defensible, 
not just pragmatically desirable.”52 In their view, torture is morally justifiable on 
utilitarian grounds, namely “when more grave harm can be avoided by using torture as an 
interrogation device.”53 They then proceed to set up their version of the ticking bomb 
scenario.54 Bagaric and Clarke conclude that the absolute prohibition against torture is 
                                                                                                                                                 
(“[T]orture in general certainly shocks the conscience of most civilized nations. But what if it were limited 
to the rare ‘ticking bomb’ case--the situation in which a captured terrorist who knows of an imminent large-
scale threat refuses to disclose it? Would torturing one guilty terrorist to prevent the deaths of a thousand 
innocent civilians shock the conscience of all decent people?”); Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to torture? Get 
a Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2002, at A19 (“The Israeli Supreme Court left open the possibility, 
however, that in an actual ‘ticking bomb’ case—a situation in which a terrorist refused to divulge 
information necessary to defuse a bomb that was about to kill hundreds of innocent civilians—an agent 
who employed physical pressure could defend himself against criminal charges by invoking ‘the law of 
necessity.’ No such case has arisen since this court decision, despite numerous instances of terrorism in that 
troubled part of the world. Nor has there ever been a ticking bomb case in this country. But inevitably one 
will arise, and we should be prepared to confront it. It is important that a decision be made in advance of an 
actual ticking bomb case about how we should deal with this inevitable situation.”). 
45 DERSHOWITZ, supra note  44, at 137. 
46 Id. at 144. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 158-59. 
49 Id. at 151. 
50 Id. at 158-59. 
51 Alan M. Dershowitz, Tortured Reasoning, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 257, 266 (Sanford Levinson ed., 
2004). 
52 Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The Circumstances in Which 
Torture is Morally Justifiable 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 581, 582-83 (2005). A similarly enthusiastic view is put 
forward by columnist Charles Krauthammer, who sets up the ticking bomb scenario where the choice is to 
torture or have one million people die: “Not only is it permissible to hang this miscreant by his thumbs. It is 
a moral duty.” See Charles Krauthammer, The Truth About Torture, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Dec. 5, 
2005, at 21, available at 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/400rhqav.asp. 
53 Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 52, at 583. 
54 Id. (“Consider the following example: A terrorist network has activated a large bomb on one of hundreds 
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untenable, and that a legal framework that sanctions the use of torture in certain 
exceptional circumstances should be devised.55 
¶19 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule also argue for the legalization and regulation of 
what they term “coercive interrogation,” a label that encompasses torture as well as cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment.56 In their view, there is nothing exceptional about 
coercive interrogation, meaning that it should be dealt with like any other coercive state 
practice. Consequently, they recommend subjecting coercive interrogation to ex ante 
legal regulation, which would include Dershowitz-style warrants.57 In the course of their 
argument, they also invoke the ticking bomb scenario to overcome the absolute 
deontological position.58 
B.  The ticking bomb scenario in official discourse 
¶20 The invocation of the ticking bomb was not limited to academics. Versions of it 
became a part of the official discourse on torture; the ticking bomb scenario can be found 
in various memoranda concerning the treatment of detainees, as well as in official 
statements made by various members of the Bush administration on the same issue. An 
early memorandum, attributed to then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales but reportedly 
the work of long-time Cheney aide, David Addington,59 set the tone for the 
administration’s treatment of detainees in the “war on terror.” It asserted that the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to either the conflict with al Qaeda or the Taliban, a view that 
President Bush subsequently would largely endorse.60 Elements of the ticking bomb 
scenario are immediately apparent: 
As you have said, the war against terrorism is a new kind of war… The 
nature of the new war places a high premium on other factors, such as the 
ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their 
sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against American civilians… 
In my judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict 
                                                                                                                                                 
of commercial planes carrying over three hundred passengers that is flying somewhere in the world at any 
point in time. The bomb is set to explode in thirty minutes. The leader of the terrorist organization 
announces this intent via a statement on the Internet. He states that the bomb was planted by one of his 
colleagues at one of the major airports in the world in the past few hours. No details are provided regarding 
the location of the plane where the bomb is located. Unbeknown to him, he was under police surveillance 
and is immediately apprehended by police. The terrorist leader refuses to answer any questions of the 
police, declaring that the passengers must die and will do so shortly.”). 
55 Id. at 616. 
56 ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE 184 (2007). 
57 Id. at 185. 
58 Id. at 187 (“One might hold that coercive interrogation is absolutely impermissible, as a violation of 
rights rooted in human dignity or autonomy. This position is held by a very few moral philosophers. Here, 
the ticking-bomb hypotheticals are important: while it is possible to argue that such cases are so rare that 
they should be ignored by a rule-consequentialist calculus ex ante, an argument we consider below, it is 
fanatical to argue on deontological grounds that rights against coercive interrogation should not be 
overridden to prevent serious harms to others.”). 
59 JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE 124 (2008). 
60 Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President, the Sec’y of State, the Sec’y of 
Def., et al., Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7 2002), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/Bush 2-7-02.pdf (stating that GCIII did not apply to the 
conflict with al Qaeda and that, although GCIII did apply to the conflict with the Taliban, the Taliban 
detainees did not satisfy the requirements for prisoner of war status). 
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limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of 
its provisions.61 
¶21 The ticking bomb scenario is also evident in the most infamous of the Bush 
administration’s “torture memos,”62 the Bybee memorandum.63 This memorandum was 
written because of the concerns of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) about the 
legality of its interrogators’ actions. Soon after 9/11, the CIA had been given a broad 
mandate to track down, detain and kill certain terrorists.64 Thus began the High-Value 
Detainee (HVD) program.65 The CIA subsequently interrogated a number of high-level al 
Qaeda operatives using various coercive interrogation techniques. CIA officials disagreed 
about the propriety of such techniques: some thought more latitude was appropriate, 
while others were concerned about potential legal exposure.66 The CIA consequently 
sought clarification from the Department of Justice. This led to internal discussions 
amongst high-level decision-makers, and eventually the creation of the Bybee 
memorandum of August 2002,67 now widely acknowledged to be the work of John 
Yoo,68 which tendentiously interpreted its way around the Torture Statute69 by various 
means. In the course of a discussion about the potential availability of the criminal law 
defense of necessity to an interrogator, the ticking bomb scenario appears: 
[A] detainee may possess information that could enable the United States 
to prevent attacks that potentially could equal or surpass the September 11 
attacks in their magnitude. Clearly, any harm that might occur during an 
interrogation would pale to insignificance compared to the harm avoided 
by preventing such an attack, which could take hundreds or thousands of 
lives.70 
¶22 Around the same time, military commanders at Guantánamo Bay were under 
pressure to obtain more intelligence from their captives. This eventually resulted in a 
push to loosen the restrictions on the use of coercive interrogation techniques.71 The 
                                                 
61 Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Att’y Gen., to the President  of the United States, Decision Re 
Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban 
(Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf. 
62 A Guide to the Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES,  http://www.nytimes.com/ref/international/24MEMO-
GUIDE.html. 
63 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales,  Standards of Conduct 
for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 41 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf [hereinafter Bybee Memo]. 
64 Jane Mayer, The Black Sites, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 13, 2007, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/08/13/070813fa_fact_mayer. 
65 Parl. Assem. of the Council of Eur. [PACE], Comm. on Legal Affairs & Human Rights, Secret 
Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council Of Europe Member States: Second Report, 
¶¶ 51-71, AS/Jur (2007) 36 (June 7, 2007), available at 
http://www.bernan.com/images/PDF/EMarty_20070608_NoEmbargo.pdf. 
66 ALFRED W. MCCOY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE 120-21 (2006). 
67 Id. at 121. 
68 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 142 (2007). 
69  18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2000). 
70 Bybee Memo, supra note 63, at 40-41. 
71 See infra text accompanying notes 188-192. 
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military leadership at Guantánamo sought and obtained high-level authorization: in 
December 2002, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld authorized the use of certain additional 
interrogation techniques such as forced standing.72 This and other coercive techniques 
were used on Mohamed al-Qahtani, one of several possible 20th September 11 
hijackers.73 However, in January 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld rescinded his earlier 
authorization, and convened a special Defense Department Working Group to consider 
the issue of interrogation. The final Working Group memorandum authorized the use of 
most of the same techniques that had earlier been authorized by Secretary Rumsfeld.74 
These included techniques euphemistically described as “environmental manipulation” 
and “reversing sleep cycles from night to day” and “isolation.”75 The ticking bomb 
scenario appears once again in relation to the necessity defense: 
According to public and governmental reports, al Qaeda has other sleeper 
cells within the United States that may be planning similar attacks [to 
9/11]. Indeed, al Qaeda’s plans apparently include efforts to develop and 
deploy chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. 
Under these circumstances, a detainee may possess information that could 
enable the United States to prevent attacks that potentially could equal or 
surpass the September 11 attacks in their magnitude. Clearly, any harm 
that might occur during an interrogation would pale to insignificance 
compared to the harm avoided by preventing such an attack, which could 
take hundreds or thousands of lives.76 
¶23 In September 2006, just prior to the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, President 
Bush requested that Congress enact legislation to authorize military commissions to try 
terrorists.77 In the course of this speech, President Bush revealed that a small number of 
terrorist suspects had been detained and interrogated outside the United States by the 
CIA.78 This was the first official acknowledgement of the CIA’s HVD program and its 
                                                 
72 MCCOY, supra note 66, at 127. 
73 Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, Inside the Interrogation of Detainee 063, TIME, June 12, 2005, at 26, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1071284,00.html. A Bush administration 
official, Susan Crawford, later concluded that al-Qahtani had been tortured. See Bob Woodward, Detainee 
Tortured, Says U.S. Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at A1.  
74 MCCOY, supra note 66, at 128-29. 
75 Id. at 129. 
76 U.S. Dep’t of Def., Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: 
Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations 26 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/03.04.04.pdf; see also Memorandum from John 
Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to William J. Haynes, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def., Military 
Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States 62 (March 14, 2003), 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc-interrogation.pdf  (“So, if officials had credible threat 
information that a U.S. city was to be the target of a large-scale terrorist attack a month from now and the 
detainee was in a position to have information that could lead to the thwarting of that attack, physical 
contact such as shoving or slapping the detainee clearly would not be disproportionate to the threat posed. 
In such an instance, those conducting the interrogations would have acted in good faith rather than 
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”). 
77 Congress would eventually accede to this request. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, supra note 20. 
78 President George W. Bush, Discussing Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists 
(Sept. 6, 2006), transcript available at  
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html. 
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associated “black sites,” interrogation facilities located at various places around the 
world.79 President Bush also defended the CIA’s use of “an alternative set of 
procedures”80 for interrogating the high-value al Qaeda detainees in the familiar terms of 
the ticking bomb scenario. He emphasized the success of these alternative procedures in 
broad terms, but adhered to the position that the United States did not engage in torture: 
these alternative procedures, while tough, were “safe, and lawful, and necessary.”81 The 
CIA’s special program was necessary because these detainees were “dangerous men with 
unparalleled knowledge about terrorist networks and their plans for new attacks.” 
Accordingly, it was imperative that CIA agents have the operational flexibility to unlock 
these men’s secrets: “The security of our nation and the lives of our citizens depend on 
our ability to learn what these terrorists know.”82 Even though he stated that there were 
no longer any detainees in the HVD program, President Bush reserved the right to start it 
up again if the need arose: 
[W]e will continue working to collect the vital intelligence we need to 
protect our country. . . . But as more high-ranking terrorists are captured, 
the need to obtain intelligence from them will remain critical—and having 
a CIA program for questioning terrorists will continue to be crucial to 
getting life-saving information.83 
¶24 Similarly, in 2008, when CIA director Michael Hayden admitted before the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence that three high-value terrorist detainees had been 
subjected to waterboarding,84 he justified the use of this technique by alluding to the 
ticking bomb scenario. In his view, waterboarding could be justifiably employed if “an 
unlawful combatant is possessing information that would help us prevent catastrophic 
loss of life of Americans or their allies.”85 
                                                 
79 The story was originally broken in 2005. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A1. For an account of life at a black site, see Mark Benjamin, Inside the 
CIA’s Notorious “Black Sites,” SALON.COM, Dec. 15, 2007,  
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/12/14/bashmilah.  
80 The euphemism “alternative set of procedures,” like its post-9/11 variants “torture lite,” “moderate 
physical pressure,” “enhanced interrogation” and “highly coercive interrogation” are reminiscent of earlier 
euphemisms for torture, such as the Nazis’ “sharpened interrogation,” and the “pushed interrogation” of the 
French in Algeria. See DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY 358 (2007). 
81 President Bush, supra note 78. Given what is known about the interrogation practices of the CIA’s HVD 
program, these assertions of legality strain credulity. See JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR 31-32 (2006) 
(describing various interrogation techniques such as confinement in confined boxes, sleep deprivation, 
sensory deprivation, stress positions and water-boarding, and noting that CIA officials familiar with the 
interrogations of high-value al Qaeda detainees have “no doubts in their minds that the CIA is torturing its 
prisoners.”). See also Mayer, supra note 64 (describing the use of similar techniques, and quoting an expert 
as saying that the CIA’s interrogation program is “one of the most sophisticated, refined programs of 
torture ever”); MAYER, supra note 59, at 272-78 (discussing the interrogation techniques used on Khalid 
Sheik Mohammed). 
82 President Bush, supra note 78.  
83 Id. 
84 This was the first such public admission by a high-ranking intelligence official. See Richard Esposito & 
Jason Ryan, CIA Chief: We Waterboarded, ABC NEWS, Feb. 5, 2008,  
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=4244423. 
85 Terry Freiden, CIA Director: Waterboarding Necessary, but Potentially Illegal, CNN.COM, Feb. 7, 2008, 
available at http://a.findtarget.com/CNN.php?/2008/POLITICS/02/07/mukasey.waterboarding/index.html. 
See also Charlie Savage, Bush Could Bypass New Torture Ban, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2006, at A1, 
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¶25 In sum, the logic and rhetoric of the ticking bomb scenario features strongly and 
consistently in this official discourse; those being interrogated are dangerous men with 
information about grave threats to national security. In order to save lives, that 
information needs to be extracted by any means necessary. 
C.  The Ticking Bombs of 24 
¶26 Perhaps the most recognizable standard-bearer for life-saving torture from 2001 to 
2008 has been the fictional Jack Bauer, hero of Fox’s highly successful drama 24.86 Bauer 
personifies the idea that effective counterterrorism requires the freedom to do whatever is 
necessary to ensure national security, including torture. Each season of 24 tracks a single 
twenty-four hour day with Bauer and his fellow agents at the fictional Counterterrorist 
Unit (CTU), who must protect the nation from various terrorist threats. The urgency and 
tension of the show is emphasized by its distinctive narrative device of a real-time digital 
clock that counts down each hour at the beginning and end of each episode, and after 
each commercial break.87 Inevitably, in the course of a season of 24, Bauer forcibly 
interrogates various people connected to the terrorist plot for critical information. Almost 
invariably, these people divulge that information, allowing Bauer to eventually foil the 
terrorists’ nefarious plans. 
¶27 Popular depictions of the ticking bomb scenario are not new. For example, Darius 
Rejali notes that such stories have been told in many television programs, and novels 
such as Jean Lartéguy’s Les Centurions, which includes a scene where a French soldier in 
Algeria tortures a dentist-cum-terrorist and forces him to reveal the location of 15 bombs 
that he has set to explode the next morning.88 Likewise, Clint Eastwood’s Dirty Harry, a 
maverick cop with little patience for bureaucratic niceties, was willing to torture when 
circumstances required it. In the eponymous 1971 film, Eastwood’s character faces a 
situation similar to the ticking bomb scenario: he tortures Scorpio, a serial killer, in order 
to discover the location of a kidnapped child before she dies. He succeeds in extracting 
the information, but the girl is already dead. To rub salt in the wound, Scorpio is released 
because of the unlawful nature of Dirty Harry’s tactics.89 
¶28 Given the news and discussion about torture after 9/11, there was an air of 
inevitability about torture becoming a dramatic device—a form of entertainment.90 But 
                                                                                                                                                 
available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/01/04/bush_could_bypass_new_torture_ban/ (discussing 
a senior administration official’s comments that President Bush intended to reserve the right to violate the 
prohibition on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment contained in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005), in exceptional situations such as a ticking bomb scenario). 
86 Alessandra Stanley, Bombers Strike, and America Is in Turmoil. It’s Just Another Day for Jack Bauer, 
N.Y. TIMES, January 12, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/12/arts/television/12twen.html (noting that the steady increase in the 
show’s ratings since 2001). 
87 See Jane Mayer, Whatever It Takes, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 19, 2007, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/02/19/070219fa_fact_mayer. 
88 REJALI, supra note 80, at 545-47. 
89 DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. Studios 1971). See also Uwe Steinhoff, Torture —The Case for Dirty 
Harry and Against Alan Dershowitz, 23 J. OF APPLIED PHIL. 337 (2006). This particular scenario has an 
eerie similarity to the real life case involving Frankfurt Police Vice-President Wolfgang Daschner. See 
Florian Jessberger, Bad Torture—Good Torture?, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1059 (2005). 
90 Scott Horton, How Hollywood Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the (Ticking) Bomb, HARPERS, March 
1, 2008, available at http://harpers.org/archive/2008/03/hbc-90002531 (“The entertainment industry latches 
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24, which first aired in November 2001, around the time that Alan Dershowitz began 
speaking of ticking bombs and torture warrants,91 has taken the depiction of torture to a 
new level. Of course, in accordance with the ticking bomb scenario that the show 
wholeheartedly embraces, Bauer (and sometimes his CTU colleagues) torture only in 
order to uncover critical information that will forestall disaster and save lives. But given 
the frequency of ticking bombs in 24—indeed, the show might aptly be described as a 
series of ticking bomb situations contained within a season long ticking bomb scenario—
graphic scenes of interrogational torture are frequent92 and have become a hallmark of the 
show. The characteristics of 24’s depiction of torture are discussed further below.93 
1. Torture is Always a Response to an Urgent Threat 
¶29 Jack Bauer only tortures when compelled to by extreme exigency. Unlike some of 
the evil forces in 24 (terrorists, the Chinese government), who torture sadistically or 
gratuitously, Bauer only tortures for the purposes of eliciting life-saving information.94 
For example, in season 2, Bauer interrogates Syed Ali, the terrorist leader involved in an 
attempt to detonate a nuclear bomb in Los Angeles. Ali refuses to give up any 
information. Bauer has Ali’s son executed while Ali watches over a video-link, and 
threatens to execute the other. Ali finally relents and reveals the location of the bomb and 
key details of the plot. It is revealed later in the episode that in fact Bauer only staged the 
executions over the video-link.95 
¶30 Similarly, in season 4, Sarah Gavin, a CTU employee, is framed by a mole in the 
agency, leading CTU to believe that she knows the location of a device that will halt the 
impending meltdown of several nuclear reactors. Erin O’Driscoll, the head of CTU 
demands that Gavin reveal the location of the device, emphasizing that “thousands of 
people’s lives are at stake.”96 Faced with Gavin’s unresponsiveness and impending 
disaster, O’Driscoll orders that Gavin be tortured even as she expresses some doubt over 
Gavin’s guilt. Gavin is repeatedly shocked with a taser, and injected with a pain-inducing 
drug.97 
¶31 In the same season, Bauer suspects that his love interest’s ex-husband, Paul Raines, 
is connected to the same terrorist plot to cause multiple nuclear reactors to melt down, 
                                                                                                                                                 
on to the events of the day and tries to take a ride from them. That is the simple nature of things.”). 
91 See Alan M. Dershowitz, Is There a Torturous Road to Justice?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at 19, 
available at http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith//courses01/rrtw/Dershowitz.htm; see also PHILIPPE SANDS, 
TORTURE TEAM 64 (2008). 
92 Horton, supra note 90 (noting 67 torture scenes in 24’s first five seasons); Adam Green, Normalizing 
Torture, One Rollicking Hour At a Time, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005, § 2, at 34; Matt Feeney, Torture 
Chamber, SLATE, Jan. 6, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2093269/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2009). See also 
Christopher J. Patrick & Deborah L. Patrick, The Third Degree, in JACK BAUER FOR PRESIDENT 87, 98-99 
(Richard Miniter ed., 2008). 
93 See generally Tung Yin, Jack Bauer Syndrome: Hollywood’s Depiction of National Security Law, 17 S. 
CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 279 (2008) (considering 24’s depiction of torture and Arab villains). 
94 Sam Kamin, How the War on Terror May Affect Domestic Interrogations: The 24 Effect, 10 CHAP. L. 
REV.  693, 708 (2007); James R. Silkenat & Peter M. Norman, Jack Bauer and the Rule of Law: The Case 
of Extraordinary Rendition, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 535, 546 (2007) (“In the show, there are only hours or 
even minutes left to find the one crucial piece of intelligence. In reality, detainees are often tortured for 
months, without reference to any specific terrorist plot.”). 
95 24: Day 2: 7:00 p.m. - 8:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast Feb. 11, 2003). 
96 24: Day 4: 2:00 p.m. - 3:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast Feb. 7, 2005). 
97 Id. 
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because he owns a building used to plan an earlier terrorist attack that day. Bauer subjects 
Raines to improvisational electroshock torture with a live electrical wire pulled out of a 
hotel lamp. Bauer justifies his torture of Raines by emphasizing how he does not have 
time to obtain the information any other way, and that he has to find out what Raines, at 
this stage an uncooperative suspect, knows about the terrorist plot.98 
2. Torture Rapidly Generates Important Intelligence Information 
¶32 In the world of 24, torture swiftly yields critical intelligence.99 In almost all cases, it 
goes without saying that Bauer or his colleagues have before them a factually guilty 
terrorist, or at least someone complicit in the terrorist plot.100 Moreover, as Sam Kamin 
notes, “The imposition of torture on a suspect invariably and almost instantaneously 
forces the suspect to speak and to speak truthfully about what she knows.”101 While the 
effectiveness of torture as an empirical matter is a highly contested issue,102 one would 
never comprehend this from watching 24, where torture reveals critical information at a 
breakneck pace almost without fail. For example, Paul Raines is initially defiant, and has 
nothing to say in the face of Bauer’s questions. However, several electric shocks quickly 
persuade him to check the business records on his laptop more closely. As Bauer 
ominously dangles the live wires near his cheek, Raines uncovers an important link to 
terrorist mastermind Habib Marwan.103 
¶33 In season 2, National Security Advisor Roger Stanton is revealed to be a traitor, 
and is interrogated about the location of a nuclear device that is to be detonated in Los 
Angeles. A Secret Service agent puts his feet in a bucket of water and electrocutes him 
with a defibrillator.104 In the next episode, Stanton’s interrogation continues as the 
President watches on; “Everyone breaks eventually,” he observes.105 Stanton manages to 
hold out for longer than most of 24’s villains, but eventually discloses information in the 
following episode.106 Indeed, seemingly the only exception to the rule that everyone 
breaks eventually is Jack Bauer himself. As he is returned by the Chinese government 
after a long period of detention and torture in season 6, a Chinese official remarks, with 
apparent grudging admiration, that Bauer never broke his silence.107 
¶34 For Joel Surnow, the co-creator and executive producer of 24, torture is more than a 
just a dramatic device; he clearly believes in the efficacy of torture as an article of faith.108 
                                                 
98 24: Day 4: 5:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast Feb. 28, 2005). 
99 Silkenat & Norman, supra note 94, at 547. This is denied, however, by at least one of the show’s writers. 
See James Surowiecki, The Worst Day Ever, SLATE, Jan. 17, 2006,  
http://www.slate.com/id/2134395/fr/rss/. 
100 Sarah Gavin’s torture in season 4 is a notable exception. However, as Tung Yin observes, Bauer himself 
is never wrong. See Yin, supra note 93, at 284-85. 
101 Kamin, supra note 94, at 706-07; see also Yin, supra note 93, at 285. 
102 See infra text accompanying notes 133-160. 
103 24: Day 4: 5:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m., supra note 98. 
104 24: Day 2: 6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast Feb. 4, 2003). 
105 24: Day 2: 7:00 p.m. - 8:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast Feb. 11, 2003). 
106 24: Day 2: 8:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast Feb. 18, 2003). 
107 24: Day 6: 6:00 a.m. - 7:00 a.m. (FOX television broadcast Jan. 14, 2007). 
108 See Mayer, supra note 87 (quoting Surnow as saying, “We’ve had all of these torture experts come by 
recently, and they say, ‘You don’t realize how many people are affected by this. Be careful.’ They say 
torture doesn’t work. But I don’t believe that.”). John Yoo, author of many of the Bush administration’s 
memoranda concerning the war on terrorism, has a similar view about the use of torture and coercion. See 
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By contrast, Douglas Johnson, the Executive Director of the Center for the Victims of 
Torture, testified to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that torture does not swiftly 
elicit information. It is a time-consuming process, and the information elicited is often 
unreliable.109 Thus, the instant efficacy of torture as depicted on 24, where “Jack Bauer 
seems successfully to torture someone to extract crucial national security information 
from one commercial break to the next” bears little relation to the reality of torture.110 
3. There are Few Adverse Consequences for the Torture Victim 
¶35 Victims of torture in 24 often recover quickly and experience no long-term adverse 
effects. They may even cooperate and work with the person or agency that has just 
finished torturing them. Their experience of torture is, it seems, quite transitory.111 For 
example, Paul Raines, just hours after being electrocuted by Bauer, assists his former 
torturer by using his computer database expertise to recover files from terrorist Habib 
Marwan’s workplace computer.112 Later Raines helps Bauer fight off a team of 
mercenaries, and even takes a bullet for Bauer (which eventually kills him).113 Similarly, 
Sarah Gavin willingly goes back to work for CTU after a brief period of recovery in the 
infirmary. Soon after returning to her workstation, she even has the presence of mind to 
request that O’Driscoll have her arrest expunged from her record and give her a pay raise 
as compensation for being wrongfully tortured.114 
¶36 As Claudia Card observes, “The FOX network television serial drama ‘24,’ . . . 
does real torture victims a disservice by sanitizing torture and presenting victims as 
bouncing back from it the next day, as though it were no worse than a painful tooth 
extraction.”115 Such swift and miraculous recoveries from torture, of course, are not 
reflective of the experience of actual torture victims, who may—in addition to any 
ongoing physical effects—experience serious psychological and emotional problems such 
as memory loss, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder.116  
4. Summary: Just leave it to Jack 
¶37 24 epitomizes the dominant ticking bomb-centered narrative about torture.117 The 
clock is counting down and time is running out; with its omniscient view, the audience 
                                                                                                                                                 
MAYER, supra note 59, at 134 (quoting Yoo as saying, “It works—we know it does. The CIA says it does 
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will confess to something, it takes a lot of time.”). See also infra text accompanying notes 133-160. 
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112 24: Day 4: 6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m. (FOX television broadcast March 7, 2005). 
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115 Claudia Card, Ticking Bombs and Interrogations, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 1, 9 (2008). 
116 See Testimony of Douglas A. Johnson, supra note 109 (detailing the serious longer-term effects on 
victims of torture). See also JOHN CONROY, UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY PEOPLE 169-183 (2000).  
117 The fictional nature of the ticking bomb scenario is acknowledged by one of the show’s co-creators, 
Bob Cochran. See Clive Thompson, Cruel Intentions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005 (Magazine), available at 
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knows the person about to be tortured has some vital clue, and that absent heroic 
intervention, nuclear incineration (or some equivalent horror) awaits.118 The only hope of 
discovering the critical clue necessary to thwart the terrorist attack is someone like Jack 
Bauer, who is willing to torture when necessary. 
¶38 Season 4’s torture of Joe Prado, a man connected to the season’s uber-villain 
Marwan, offers perhaps the paradigmatic depiction of torture in 24.119 Prado is captured 
by CTU, but his interrogation is delayed after Marwan notifies the human rights 
organization, Amnesty Global, that CTU is planning to torture an innocent man.120 Just as 
CTU agents are about to inject Prado with some type of drug, David Weiss, an attorney 
from Amnesty Global, shows up at CTU—protective court order in hand—and halts 
Prado’s interrogation.121 Weiss remains unmoved by appeals from various members of 
CTU, who argue that many lives depend on finding out what Prado knows. The President 
of the United States, meanwhile, is unwilling to authorize Prado’s torture without 
consulting the Justice Department. Bauer takes matters into his own hands by resigning 
from CTU, and torturing the critical information about Marwan out of Prado as a private 
citizen.122 
¶39 The audience knows that Prado is involved with Marwan, but CTU is unable to 
uncover this information because Weiss, the Amnesty Global lawyer, intervenes to 
protect Prado’s legal rights. The audience also knows that Amnesty Global was tipped off 
by Marwan himself, making both Weiss and Amnesty Global unwitting agents of 
“lawfare.”123 Additionally, the President is gun-shy, and unwilling to act without 
bureaucratic cover. But in spite of all these obstacles, Bauer once again saves the day 
with torture.124 The unapologetic message of this episode, and by extension the show, is 
that torture works, that torture is necessary,125 and that rather being a tool of dictators and 
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tyrants, torture is an act of rebellious heroism.126 Those who would stop Jack Bauer from 
doing his job—smug liberals, spineless politicians, and dangerously naïve human rights 
groups—are to be viewed with contempt. What the real Jack Bauers of the world need is 
the unfettered discretion to protect national security.127  
III. ART IMITATES LIFE: SKEPTICISM ABOUT TORTURE AND BATTLESTAR GALACTICA  
¶40 Overall, the first narrative of torture described above proved dominant for most of 
the duration of the Bush administration. But it was, and is, subject to challenge by the 
second and alternative narrative of torture, which challenges the validity of the first 
narrative’s centerpiece, the ticking bomb scenario, by highlighting how it obscures 
several important assumptions—most significantly, that torture is actually effective—and 
how it ignores the long-run costs of torture.  
¶41 Resistance to the first narrative was particularly pronounced in the academic arena, 
where academic commentators vigorously contested the validity of the ticking bomb 
scenario. Even where the first narrative arguably achieved its greatest dominance, 
amongst government actors, there was dissent from some, most notably the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and military lawyers. At the level of popular culture, Sci-
Fi’s Battlestar Galactica portrays the use of torture and coercion ambiguously, and, as 
will be argued below, skeptically. Battlestar Galactica’s account of torture thus forms an 
interesting counterpoint to the ticking bombs and moral certainty of 24. 
A.  Academic Counterarguments to the Ticking Bomb Scenario 
¶42 Although Dershowitz’s torture warrant proposal probably attracted the most 
attention, he was by no means the only—nor indeed the most enthusiastic—advocate of 
interrogational torture and coercion. His torture warrant proposal may be faulted on the 
basis that it will not achieve his professed goal of minimizing torture.128 But a more 
fundamental critique can be made of Dershowitz’s position, and by extension others who 
rely on the ticking bomb scenario to undermine the absolute prohibition on torture. Like 
the economist trapped on the desert island with a can of food who, according to the well-
worn joke, simply assumes a can-opener, the ticking bomb scenario assumes away all the 
difficulties and untidiness of reality. 
¶43 As Luban has thoroughly demonstrated, the ticking bomb scenario depends on a 
series of assumptions,129 of which four are particularly important. The scenario assumes: 
first, that the interrogator knows that disaster is imminent unless he or she acts; second, 
that the interrogator has the terrorist who has the requisite knowledge; third, that torturing 
                                                 
126 See Teresa Wiltz, Torture’s Tortured Cultural Roots, WASH. POST, May 3, 2005, at C1 (observing the 
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the terrorist (and nothing else) will reveal the critical information; and fourth, that we are 
dealing with a one-off situation. These assumptions are examined further below. 
1. Disaster is Imminent 
¶44 The ticking bomb scenario conveniently stipulates that authorities know that a 
bomb is ticking somewhere; typically, the interrogator knows that terrorists have planted 
a bomb in a major city that will detonate with catastrophic consequences in several hours. 
But reality rarely, if ever, presents such black and white situations. Even if one accepts 
that the United States is engaged in a war on terrorism, and is faced with an ongoing 
terrorist threat, the decision of whether to use torture will in all likelihood have to be 
made under a much more uncertain set of circumstances.130  
2. The Captive is the Terrorist Bomber 
¶45 A further built-in assumption is that authorities have actually captured the right 
person: “it is built into the hypothetical that he is a terrorist.”131 This conveniently 
eliminates any concerns that authorities might have the wrong person, and be at risk of 
torturing an innocent. Even if the captive is not the actual bomber, at the very least, it is 
taken for granted that the captive is part of the terrorist plot, and has enough information 
that, if revealed, would allow authorities to prevent disaster. However, in reality, things 
are unlikely to work out so neatly: a captured member of al Qaeda, for example, may not 
know the relevant details of the terrorist plot because of the polycentric structure of the 
organization.132 
3. Torture Works 
¶46 Additionally, the ticking bomb scenario crucially assumes that torture works. 
Whether something “works” logically presupposes a yardstick for determining success. 
In the case of interrogational torture, success must be the eliciting of relevant and truthful 
information from the person interrogated.133 So the claim that torture works is the claim 
that torture not only makes people talk, but makes them speak the truth. The evidence put 
forward by the advocates of interrogational torture, however, is sketchy at best.134 
Dershowitz, for instance, claims that torture sometimes works, and that there are 
“numerous instances” to substantiate this claim.135 But only one example, the 
interrogation of Abdul Hakim Murad, actually appears in the text.136 In 1995, Philippine 
police arrested Murad and brutally tortured him in various ways for sixty-seven days. On 
Dershowitz’s account, Murad, under torture, confessed to various plots, including a plan 
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to crash eleven commercial airliners into the ocean.137 However, the Murad case has been 
thoroughly debunked. In reality, even though police had broken his ribs, burned him, and 
pumped his stomach with water for more than two months (by which time any ticking 
bombs would surely have detonated), Murad did not speak. For whatever reason, Murad 
only spoke when a new team of interrogators turned up claiming to be Mossad agents 
with the task of taking him to Israel.138 Moreover, Murad was captured with a treasure 
trove of incriminating evidence, including a manual for making liquid bombs, fake 
passports, and a computer. Once decrypted, files on the computer revealed the same 
information about these various terrorist plots.139 
¶47 Posner and Vermeule cite evidence from Israel that they admit is “anecdotal or 
impressionistic.”140 However, they conclude that this evidence nonetheless “strongly 
suggests that coercive interrogation saves lives.”141 At most, what one could safely 
conclude is that coercive interrogation may have been successful in those particular 
instances, and even that conclusion is not unproblematic.142 In any case, this evidence 
does not demonstrate that coercive interrogation is generally an effective means of 
eliciting life-saving truth, or that the “claim that coercive interrogation is ineffective is a 
delusion.”143  
¶48 Bagaric and Clarke make a similarly sweeping claim about the effectiveness of 
torture on the basis of limited evidence. They put forward one example before concluding 
that torture “is an excellent means of gathering information.”144 Their example concerns 
the actions of Frankfurt Police Vice-President Wolfgang Daschner. On Daschner’s 
instructions, a police officer told a captured child kidnapper that police would inflict pain 
on him that “he would never forget” unless he revealed the kidnapped child’s location.145 
After hearing this threat, the kidnapper revealed the location of the child, who tragically 
was already dead.146 This episode certainly appears to be an instance where threatened 
torture was able to elicit the truth. Even so, one example is a thin reed on which to base 
such an extravagant conclusion. Indeed, in a subsequent article, Bagaric and Clarke state 
rather more circumspectly that torture is sometimes effective, and cite some further 
examples, including Posner and Vermeule’s evidence from Israel, and the case of 
Murad.147 
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¶49 President Bush’s 2006 speech that revealed the CIA’s HVD program advanced 
several further examples as evidence of the success of the CIA’s “alternative set of 
procedures” for interrogating high-value al Qaeda detainees.148 Some of these examples 
do not stand up to scrutiny. The President emphasized the interrogation of al Qaeda 
member Abu Zubaydah as being significant in the apprehension of two al Qaeda leaders. 
Bush claimed that Zubaydah had revealed that “mukhtar” was the nickname of 9/11 
mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and that this was an important piece of 
information in the pursuit of Mohammed.149 However, according to the 9/11 Commission 
Report, this fact was known since August 2001.150 Additionally, some of the information 
was obtained from him without coercion.151 The ultimately redundant information about 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s nickname, for example, was revealed to an FBI agent who 
questioned Abu Zubaydah in the hospital without the use of coercion.152 A careful parsing 
of President Bush’s speech confirms that Abu Zubaydah revealed this information before 
coercion was used. 
¶50 President Bush also claimed that Abu Zubaydah, upon being subjected to the CIA’s 
“alternative set of procedures,” identified another al Qaeda leader, Ramzi bin al Shibh.153 
This claim is also dubious, as al Shibh’s involvement in al Qaeda and role in the 9/11 
attacks were already a matter of public knowledge.154 Both Ramzi bin al Shibh and 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed were ultimately apprehended through information obtained 
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from tip offs. The critical information in the apprehension of the former came from the 
Emir of Qatar; the information leading to the capture of the latter came from an 
anonymous informant who collected a $25 million reward.155 
¶51 Quite apart from the shaky evidence for torture’s effectiveness, there is also clear 
evidence of the contrary; there are clear instances of torture or coercion producing 
unreliable evidence. For example, Shafiq Rasul, Ruhal Ahmed and Asif Iqbal, known as 
the “Tipton Three,” were accused of having links to al Qaeda on the basis of being 
apparently captured on a videotape of a meeting in Afghanistan between September 11 
hijacker, Mohamed Atta, and Osama bin Laden.156 After a long period of multiple 
interrogations that included the application of various coercive techniques, Rasul 
confessed to being in the video,157 as did Ahmed and Iqbal.158 The falsity of their 
confessions was later confirmed by British intelligence, which demonstrated conclusively 
that all three had been in England at the time the video was made, as Rasul had long 
claimed.159 
¶52 Ultimately, only narrow conclusions can be drawn from these examples and 
counter-examples. It is difficult to sustain the claim that torture or coercive interrogation 
techniques never work; but it does not follow that such techniques can be characterized as 
effective in eliciting truth either. All that can be said is that the effectiveness of these 
techniques is, at best, equivocal.160 This complex reality, however, is essentially assumed 
out of the way by the ticking bomb scenario. 
4. One-off Situation 
¶53 Finally, the ticking bomb scenario assumes an individual’s decision to torture in a 
single situation of dire emergency.161 But the focus on the hypothetical moral quandary 
faced by one interrogator again obscures reality: the decision to torture is not a one-off 
decision made by a single person. Rather, as Kim Lane Scheppele emphasizes, the 
decision to employ torture involves institutions, bureaucracies and guidelines: 
The real-world question that arises is not whether you or I would torture 
the Manhattan nuclear terrorist personally, but instead whether we can 
design rules for agents in complex organizations . . . that would in fact 
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limit torture to situations like this hypothetical, where we might agree as a 
political community that torture would be warranted. The decision to 
torture is wrongly presented in the hypothetical as a personal moral 
choice, when the actual decision would in fact be a political judgment 
about standard operating procedures for a bureaucracy.162 
¶54 By making the decision to torture a personal moral choice of a lone interrogator in 
a single exceptional situation, rather than a decision situated within a bureaucracy, 
attention need not be given to such matters as the treatment of one’s own troops captured 
in future conflicts,163 or the long run impact on international legitimacy.164 Nor need there 
be concern about the possibility of the spread of the practice of torture, which was 
precisely what occurred after 9/11. The use of torture and other coercive interrogation 
techniques began with the CIA’s interrogation of high-value al Qaeda detainees who 
were thought to have critical information about further attacks on the United States.165  
Soon, however, in response to demands for more intelligence, some of the same 
techniques came to be employed more widely, first against detainees in Guantánamo, and 
later in Iraq, a traditional theater of war.166 As Jeremy Waldron observes, “The torture at 
Abu Ghraib had nothing to do with ‘ticking bomb’ terrorism. It was intended to ‘soften 
up’ detainees so that U.S. military intelligence could get information from them about 
likely attacks by Iraqi insurgents against American occupiers.”167 It is unsurprising that 
the use of torture post-9/11 spread. Indeed, this pattern is consistent with the history of 
attempts to confine and regulate torture.168 
5. Summary 
¶55 The ticking bomb scenario has, as Luban puts it, “displaced genuine issues in the 
public forum and substituted a fictitious example stacked in favor of torture-
permissiveness.”169 This fictitious example is a clever thought experiment, but one that 
has a tenuous grounding in reality. The fact that one might be willing to countenance 
torture in a hypothetical extreme situation in order to avert catastrophe provides little 
guidance as to whether torture should be adopted as part of counterterrorism policy.170 
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This is because, as detailed above, the scenario’s pristine and ideal assumptions and 
conditions are highly unlikely ever to be met.171 Even the CIA’s interrogation of high-
value Al Qaeda detainees falls outside the ticking bomb scenario’s boundaries. These 
detainees were held, interrogated, and tortured over a long period of time.172 As such, any 
imminent terrorist plots that they might have been privy to would presumably have come 
to fruition. Of course, such detainees might have had valuable information about al 
Qaeda’s operations in general or other long-range plans.173 But the use of torture and 
coercion to elicit this information, however useful, cannot be justified by the ticking 
bomb scenario if one takes its parameters seriously. 
B.  Dissenting Voices in Government 
¶56 Despite the pro-torture and coercion stance at the highest levels of the Bush 
Administration, there was not a complete consensus on either the legality or wisdom of 
employing aggressive interrogation techniques. Certain individuals and institutions, 
including notably the FBI and many military lawyers, opposed the use of torture and 
coercion on the basis of its inefficacy and long-run costs. In doing so, they reiterated 
many of the academic arguments discussed in the previous section. 
¶57 The FBI was skeptical of the utility of torture and coercive interrogation 
techniques. This was a reflection of its traditional law enforcement role, which 
emphasized the importance of obtaining statements that were admissible in court.174  The 
FBI also had experience in dealing with al Qaeda in the 1990s, including the 
investigation that led to the prosecutions for the first bombing of the World Trade Center. 
In contrast to the CIA’s more aggressive attitude, the FBI advocated a patient, non-
coercive, rapport-building approach to interrogation.175 The FBI’s approach is 
exemplified by Dan Coleman, a retired FBI agent who investigated the embassy 
bombings in Tanzania and Kenya prior to 9/11. Coleman and others succeeded in 
eliciting confessions from al Qaeda operatives, who later pleaded guilty to various 
terrorism charges.176 Coleman continued to adhere to his rapport-based view of 
interrogation after 9/11.177 
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¶58 The fate of one of the first high-ranking al Qaeda operatives captured by the United 
States, Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, represented a microcosm of the disagreement between the 
FBI and CIA over interrogating detainees. Coleman’s colleague, Jack Cloonan, urged 
FBI agents in Afghanistan to question al-Libi according to the usual protocols. The 
agents reportedly began developing a rapport with him—al-Libi even told his 
interrogators about a plot to attack the United States embassy in Aden, which was 
subsequently averted.178 The CIA, however, believing that al-Libi was not being entirely 
forthcoming, had him rendered to Egypt.179 Having been subjected to various forms of 
torture and coercion, he claimed that Iraq had trained al Qaeda members in the use of 
chemical and biological weapons.180 He subsequently recanted in 2004, but not before his 
claim of a collaborative relationship between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein had been 
used by the Bush administration as one of the justifications for the Iraq war.181  
¶59 The FBI and CIA had a similar clash over the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, who 
was captured in March 2002 and initially jointly questioned.182 The FBI was satisfied 
with the headway they were making with non-coercive questioning. The CIA once again 
felt that Abu Zubaydah was not being forthright with them, and subjected him to coercive 
techniques such as forced nudity, cold and loud music.183 One FBI agent described the 
CIA’s techniques as amounting to “borderline torture.”184 The FBI’s Counterterrorism 
Assistant Director, Pasquale D’Amuro, subsequently ordered his agents to come home 
and not participate in any aggressive interrogations.185 D’Amuro’s decision was later 
affirmed by FBI Director Robert Mueller.186  
¶60 FBI agents based at Guantánamo faced similar issues.187 In 2002, multiple 
governmental agencies, including the CIA and FBI, were present at Guantánamo. The 
military leadership at Guantánamo was also coming under increasing pressure from 
Washington to deliver actionable intelligence.188 The debate focused around the 
interrogation of Mohammed al-Qahtani,189 whose case proved to be the catalyst for the 
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loosening of the military’s rules on interrogation. In September, a series of meetings took 
place to discuss new interrogation techniques.190 The result was a memorandum written 
by Lieutenant Colonel Jerald Phifer that outlined eighteen interrogation techniques.191 
This memorandum was backed by a further memorandum written by Lieutenant Colonel 
Diane Beaver, which concluded that all the techniques were legal.192 The request for 
approval of these techniques was sent to the Pentagon. William Haynes, General Counsel 
for the Department of Defense, recommended the approval of fifteen of the eighteen 
techniques.193  Of the harshest “Category III” techniques, Haynes recommended only the 
blanket approval of “mild, non-injurious physical contact,” although he noted that “all 
Category III techniques may be legally available.”194 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld gave 
his approval on December 2, 2002.195 
¶61 As the military sought to push the interrogation envelope at Guantánamo, the FBI 
agents present objected, as evidenced by various documents later made public. For 
example, an email from a FBI counterterrorism official to General Donald Ryder of the 
Army’s Criminal Investigation Command detailed instances of “highly aggressive 
interrogation techniques,” including apparent physical torture, which had been observed 
by FBI agents at Guantánamo in late 2002.196 Similarly, an unnamed FBI agent based at 
Guantánamo sent a memorandum by facsimile on November 27, 2002 to Marion 
Bowman, legal counsel at the FBI.197 This memorandum offered a legal analysis of 
various interrogation techniques that closely matched the list of techniques proposed by 
Phifer.198 It concluded that many of the techniques were illegal, and any information 
obtained through the use of such methods would be inadmissible in a criminal trial. It 
also concluded that some of the more aggressive Category II and III methods might 
violate the federal Torture Statute.199 Interestingly, the anonymous author also discussed 
the Category IV technique of extraordinary rendition—the practice of transferring 
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detainees to third countries for harsh interrogations—and concluded that “[t]his technique 
[could] not be utilized without violating U.S. Federal law.”200 
¶62 In 2003 and 2004, other unnamed FBI agents would document their observations of 
the military’s interrogations.201 In one particular email, dated December 5, 2003, an FBI 
agent referred to the military’s practices as “torture techniques.”202 The agent also noted 
that these tactics had produced no useful intelligence, and had made criminal prosecution 
of the tortured detainee impossible.203 All in all, two hundred FBI agents deployed at 
Guantánamo reported that they had heard about or observed the use of coercive 
techniques such as sleep deprivation, stress positions, shackling, isolation, bright lights 
and loud music.204 
¶63 Like the FBI, Alberto Mora, at the time the general counsel of the United States 
Navy, opposed the torture and mistreatment of detainees. Mora’s resistance centered on 
his attempt to stop the recommendations of the Defense Department Working Group 
from becoming military policy.205 In December 2002, Mora learnt of events at 
Guantánamo from David Brant of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, who 
supervised a team of agents working in conjunction with the FBI.206 Brant passed along 
his agents’ reports of the military’s interrogation practices at Guantánamo. Mora later 
saw Secretary Rumsfeld’s approval of the various coercive interrogation techniques, as 
well as the underlying legal analysis of the Beaver memorandum, which Mora considered 
flawed. Mora met with Haynes to express his concerns.207  In January 2003, Brant 
informed Mora that nothing had changed, which led to Mora meeting Haynes again.208 In 
their meeting, Haynes stated that American officials believed that the interrogation 
techniques were needed in order to extract from the Guantánamo detainees critical 
information about further attacks.209 Mora responded to Haynes’ invocation of the ticking 
bomb scenario:  
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I acknowledged the ethical issues were difficult. I was not sure what my 
position would be in the classic “ticking bomb” scenario where the 
terrorist being interrogated had knowledge of, say, an imminent nuclear 
weapon attack against a U.S. city. If I were the interrogator involved, I 
would probably apply the torture myself, although I would do so with full 
knowledge of potentially severe personal consequences. But I did not feel 
this was the factual situation we faced in Guantanamo, and even if I were 
willing to do this as an individual and assume the personal consequences, 
by the same token I did not consider it appropriate for us to advocate for 
or cause the laws and values of our nation to be changed to render the 
activity lawful.210 
¶64 On January 15, Haynes called Mora to tell him that Secretary Rumsfeld was 
suspending his earlier authorization of December 2, 2002, and that Rumsfeld was 
convening a special Defense Department Working Group to consider interrogation 
guidelines.211 However, Haynes bureaucratically outmaneuvered Mora. Despite Mora 
recommending to Haynes that Rumsfeld not approve the Working Group’s draft report, 
which was based on another memorandum written by John Yoo,212 Rumsfeld—without 
Mora’s knowledge—did just that.213 The final Working Group memorandum included a 
list of thirty-five interrogation techniques.214 On April 16, 2003, the Pentagon approved 
twenty-four of those techniques for use at Guantánamo.215 
¶65 Another locus of resistance to the use of torture and coercion was the military’s 
own lawyers, which was in keeping with the military’s traditional policy of humane 
treatment of detainees and compliance with the law of armed conflict.216 In debates over 
the treatment of detainees after 9/11, senior military lawyers consistently opposed the use 
of torture and coercion. In November 2002, military lawyers were already expressing 
reservations about the interrogation techniques proposed for use at Guantánamo. Several 
memoranda recorded serious concerns that the suggested interrogation techniques would 
be illegal and contrary to the strategic interests of the United States.217 These concerns 
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prompted further review. But William Haynes cut this short, clearing the way for 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s authorization in December 2002.218  
¶66 The resistance of the military’s lawyers continued. Notably, the leadership of the 
Judge Advocate General’s Corps, like Alberto Mora, disagreed with the approach taken 
by the Defense Department Working Group. For example, Rear Admiral Michael Lohr, 
Judge Advocate General for the United States Navy, although not contesting the 
questionable conclusions about the legality of the interrogation techniques, urged caution 
on policy grounds: 
[W]hile we may have found a unique situation in Guantánamo where the 
protections of the Geneva Conventions, U.S. statutes, and even the 
Constitution do not apply, will the American people find we have missed 
the forest for the trees by condoning practices that, while technically legal, 
are inconsistent with our most fundamental values? How would such 
perceptions affect our ability to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism?219 
¶67 Major General Jack Rives, the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the United States 
Air Force, was more pointed in his analysis, and observed that several of the exceptional 
interrogation techniques “on their face, amount[ed] to violations of domestic criminal law 
and the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice].”220 General Rives also urged that 
consideration “be given to the possible adverse effects on U.S. Armed Forces culture and 
self-image.”221 He noted that American armed forces had been “consistently trained to 
take the legal and moral ‘high-road’ in the conduct of our military operations regardless 
of how others may operate.”222 Brigadier General Kevin Sandkuhler, Staff Judge 
Advocate of the United States Marine Corps, expressed a similar view, suggesting that 
the authorization of “aggressive counter-resistance techniques” by the military would 
negatively impact the “Pride, Discipline, and Self-Respect within the U.S. Armed 
Forces.”223 General Sandkuhler and the other Judge Advocates General also highlighted 
the position of captured American service members, a matter that they did not think had 
been adequately considered.224 
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¶68 The advice of these military lawyers was ignored. In May 2003, after the Working 
Group’s report had taken effect,225 several unnamed senior members of the Judge 
Advocate General’s Corps visited Scott Horton, at the time the head of the Human Rights 
Committee of the New York City Bar Association.226 They discussed with him the 
decisions that, in their view, would lead to detainee abuse and possible violations of the 
Geneva Conventions. They urged him to challenge the Bush administration’s policies.227  
¶69 The public opposition amongst senior military lawyers towards the administration’s 
policies did not cease.228 In 2006, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the 
legal authority to prosecute terrorists. As part of those hearings, the Judge Advocates 
General of the military services were asked to submit written responses to questions 
regarding various coercive interrogation techniques, including waterboarding.229 General 
Rives, General Sandkuhler, Rear Major General Scott Black of the U.S. Army, and 
Admiral Bruce MacDonald of the U.S. Navy all concluded that waterboarding was illegal 
and violated common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.230  Generals Rives and 
Sandkuhler further stated that waterboarding would constitute torture under the Torture 
Statute.231 Their forthright answers provide a pointed contrast to the equivocations of 
Attorney General Michael Mukasey on the same issue in 2008.232 
C.  Torture and Battlestar Galactica 
¶70 Sci-Fi Channel’s remake of the television show Battlestar Galactica follows the 
basic contours of the 1970s original, where most of human society is wiped out in a 
surprise attack on the twelve colonies by the Cylons, metallic robots with the iconic 
oscillating red-eye. Protected by a single warship, the Battlestar Galactica, a fleet of the 
human survivors sets out in search of a mythical thirteenth colony, known as Earth.233 
The small band of human survivors is outgunned, on the run, and under near-constant 
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threat of oblivion—a milieu where the imperatives of necessity and survival coexist 
uneasily with legality. 
¶71 The re-imagined Battlestar Galactica differs from its 1970s iteration in some 
significant ways. It eschews the modern and clean aesthetics characteristic of much 
science fiction in favor of a vintage, naturalistic look.234 This visual presentation matches 
the darker tone of the re-imagined series, which lacks the escapist jauntiness of its 
predecessor.235 Further, in a nod to the science-fiction classic Bladerunner,236 not only are 
the Cylons originally human creations, but they now also have several models that appear 
completely human. These new Cylon models, which the humans refer to as “skin jobs,” 
act as spies, sleeper agents, and suicide bombers. The ability of these humanoid Cylons to 
effortlessly infiltrate society preys on a classic human anxiety, amplified after 9/11, of 
enemies lurking in our midst.237 Indeed the idea of a fifth column, or enemies within, has 
notable echoes in American history, including the Palmer raids, the Japanese internment 
and the red scare.238 
¶72 During the three complete seasons of Battlestar Galactica that have aired to date, 
there have been several notable depictions of coercive interrogation. The Cylons, 
naturally, engage in torture. They show little compunction in using torture during their 
occupation of New Caprica, a planet the humans have settled on at the end of season 2. 
Saul Tigh, a leader of the human resistance, for example, has his eye ripped out.239 Later, 
the Cylons torture Gaius Baltar, the wonderfully narcissistic and self-serving human 
genius, for information about a virus that has infected them.240 However, the focus of this 
article is on instances when humans, with whom the audience for the most part identifies, 
employ torture and coercion.241 
¶73 Battlestar Galactica’s depiction of torture by humans is ostensibly ambiguous. 
According to the show’s creators, this was a deliberate choice, the idea being to 
undermine the settled expectations of the audience and force them to confront difficult 
issues.242 This moral ambiguity is a hallmark of the show.243 However, as Christian 
Erickson argues, a morally ambiguous depiction already contains an element of 
subversiveness;244 ambiguity is subversive because it undermines the certainty of the 
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discourse of counter-terrorism.245 Erickson is referring primarily to the actions of the 
humans at the beginning of season 3, when most of the human race remains trapped on 
Cylon-occupied New Caprica.246 Harking back to Vichy France, and alluding more 
controversially to the Iraqi insurgency,247 some of the humans form an underground 
resistance to oppose the Cylons and their puppet human government. The resistance’s 
tactics include suicide bombing. The humans themselves do not agree on the morality of 
their actions: while resistance leader Saul Tigh sees suicide bombing as a necessary 
means to an end, Laura Roslin (the human President for most of the show) ultimately 
cannot countenance such action.248 The correct course is left unclear.249 The same point 
applies to Battlestar Galactica’s portrayal of torture and coercion. The audience is 
confronted with the question of whether torturing the captive is the correct course, with 
the result that it is often unclear whether one should empathize with the torturer or the 
tortured.250 This contrasts with the moral certainty characteristic both of 24,251 and some 
real-world advocates of torture.252 
¶74 In addition to this subversive ambiguity, the relevant episodes of Battlestar 
Galactica, on closer inspection, reproduce some of the critiques of the use of 
interrogational torture and coercion discussed in the previous sections. In particular, the 
use of torture and coercion is depicted as ineffective and difficult (if not impossible) to 
contain. 
1. Skepticism about the Efficacy of Torture 
¶75 Battlestar Galactica consistently portrays the use of torture and coercion as being an 
ineffective tool of interrogation, particularly relative to non-coercive alternatives. The 
season 1 episode that deals with torture was prompted by the events at Abu Ghraib prison 
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in Iraq.253 Here, one of the human-like Cylons, known as Leoben Conroy, is captured 
aboard a civilian ship in the fleet. Commander William Adama, who commands the 
Galactica, wants him destroyed; President Roslin wants him interrogated. Lieutenant 
Kara Thrace (usually referred to by her call-sign “Starbuck”) begins to interrogate 
Leoben, who claims to have planted a nuclear warhead somewhere in the fleet that will 
detonate in less than nine hours.254 And so Battlestar Galactica sets up a classic ticking 
bomb scenario. 
¶76 Starbuck informs Adama and Roslin about the bomb. Adama orders radiological 
searches throughout the fleet while Starbuck returns to interrogate Leoben further about 
the location of the bomb. Starbuck surmises that because Leoben is programmed to act 
like a human, he will respond to stimuli, such as pain.255 The interrogation quickly turns 
violent as Starbuck has a marine beat Leoben. Although he is bloodied, Leoben reveals 
nothing. In the face of Leoben’s intransigence, Starbuck decides to up the torture ante: 
“Now the gloves come off,” she tells Leoben,256 echoing the real-life words of former 
counterterrorism official Cofer Black.257 Starbuck then has marines force Leoben 
underwater for increasing periods of time.258 Leoben talks, but not about the location of 
the bomb. Near the conclusion of the episode, President Roslin arrives to halt Starbuck’s 
torture of Leoben, which has not revealed any useful information. She admonishes 
Starbuck: “You spent the last eight hours torturing this man, this machine, whatever it is. 
And you don’t have a single piece of information to show for it.”259 After Leoben has 
been dried off, Roslin apologizes to him about his treatment, and attempts to reason with 
him instead. Leoben reveals that in fact there is no nuclear warhead. He also insinuates 
that Adama is a Cylon. Roslin has him ejected into space.260 
¶77 The point to emphasize is that torture in this ticking bomb scenario does not work: 
Leoben never reveals any useful information under torture. Only after the torture has 
stopped does he reveal to Roslin that there is no ticking bomb. This skeptical view about 
the efficacy of torture continues in later seasons. In season 2, with the arrival of Admiral 
Helena Cain’s Battlestar Pegasus, the audience learns that the Galactica was not the only 
warship to survive the initial Cylon attack on the twelve colonies.261 It turns out that the 
Galactica and the Pegasus are each holding one human-like Cylon captive. Both Cylon 
captives are valuable because they have general knowledge of the Cylons’ nature and 
tactics, although not necessarily of their imminent plans; there are no ticking bombs to be 
heard. Indeed, this is more closely analogous to the actual situation faced by the United 
States in relation to its most valuable terrorist detainees.262 
¶78 The paths taken to uncover information from the two Cylon captives differ. Adama 
treats his Cylon captive humanely, whereas Cain is willing to use torture and coercion. 
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Their contrasting methods reflect the divergence of approach in real-life 
counterterrorism, highlighted, for example, by the disagreement between the FBI and 
CIA over the interrogation of terrorist suspects.263  
¶79 The crew of the Pegasus is holding a Cylon known as Gina. Gina posed as a 
civilian network administrator working on the Pegasus prior to the Cylon attack. Later, 
she helped “upgrade” the Pegasus’ computer systems, and found an inviting Cylon target 
to attack.264 This was in fact a trap, and the Pegasus’ weapons systems failed at the crucial 
moment, presumably having been sabotaged by Gina. The Cylons boarded the Pegasus, 
presumably aided again by Gina. During the ensuing battle inside the ship, Gina was 
revealed to be a Cylon after one of the Pegasus’ officers killed a duplicate copy of her. 
She was captured after a brief struggle.265 Stunned by Gina’s betrayal, Cain subsequently 
orders Lieutenant Thorne to interrogate her. Cain guesses that Gina has human frailties as 
well. She authorizes the use of “pain . . . degradation, fear, shame.”266 To drive home the 
point, Cain gives Thorne carte blanche: “I want you to really test its limits. Be as creative 
as you feel you need to be.”267 Subsequently, Cain looks impassively upon an obviously 
beaten and bleeding Gina. Later, it is revealed that Thorne and other members of the 
Pegasus’ crew sexually brutalized her as well.268 
¶80 By contrast, the Galactica’s Cylon prisoner, Sharon, is treated humanely. 
Commander Adama informs Admiral Cain that Sharon has been cooperative, and has 
proven to be a valuable source of intelligence.269 In fact, in the previous episode, Sharon 
saved the Galactica after a Cylon virus had infected the ship’s computer systems.270 Gaius 
Baltar confirms with Cain that Sharon has provided useful intelligence about Cylon 
systems, tactics, and strategy.271 Cain is surprised that Baltar has been able to obtain this 
intelligence without coercion. Baltar replies that he finds “the application of coercive 
techniques to be counterproductive,” and that he gets greater cooperation by treating 
Sharon “as if it’s the human being it pretends to be.”272 Although she appears to express 
some disdain for this apparent coddling of the enemy, Cain admits that the torture of Gina 
carried out by Thorne and others has proven fruitless. She requests that Baltar examine 
Gina.273 
¶81 When Baltar first sees Gina, she is manacled and chained to the floor by the neck 
and feet; she appears badly beaten, and lies motionless. Baltar demands that she be given 
food, clothing, and be allowed to bathe.274 Cain is not interested, and points out that Gina 
is responsible for the deaths of several hundred of her crew, suggesting that Gina’s 
torture may be as much about cathartic revenge as obtaining information. Baltar replies 
that the Cylon psyche can be manipulated like that of humans, and that it is time to try a 
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different approach.275 Subsequently, Baltar brings Gina some food, has the guards remove 
her restraints, and begins talking to her. At this point, she finally shows signs of life.276 
¶82 During the following episode, Cain comes to the detention cell to observe Baltar’s 
interrogation. She looks on with obvious disgust, and at one point, kicks Gina in the face 
and spits on her. Cain has pictures of a mysterious Cylon ship, and asks Baltar to see 
whether he can find out what its function is.277 Baltar later brings Gina some clothing. As 
she puts on the clothing, the audience sees the terrible scarring on her back, the result of 
the torture she has suffered.278 Having gained a measure of trust in Baltar, Gina reveals 
what her mission was, and that she expected to die upon completion of that mission. She 
tells Baltar that she wants to die.279 Baltar replies that she cannot die, because, as a Cylon, 
her consciousness will simply be downloaded into another body.280 Gina discloses that if 
the mysterious Cylon ship is destroyed, she really can die. Gina thus reveals the function 
of the previously unidentified resurrection ship, which allows downloading when the 
Cylons are far away from their home-world.281 
¶83 Once again, it is striking that the use of torture and coercion provides no useful 
intelligence. By contrast, it is Baltar who is successful in getting cooperation from Gina, 
which in turn leads to the identification of the resurrection ship. Similarly, Sharon’s 
humane treatment has already been shown to have very tangible benefits for the 
Galactica. The different treatment of the two Cylons can readily be interpreted as an 
allegorical critique of the Bush Administration’s treatment of terrorist detainees.282 
¶84 Finally, in season 3, Baltar, who collaborated with the Cylons as the head of the 
puppet government during their occupation of New Caprica, has been held by the Cylons 
for a considerable amount of time. The human leadership wishes to extract any useful 
information that he might have about the Cylons. The audience learns that Baltar has 
been deprived of sleep, and in response has gone on hunger strike; he attempts suicide at 
the beginning of the episode.283 President Roslin suggests an alternative interrogation 
plan. She questions him about his involvement with the Cylons, which he denies. Roslin 
appears to lose her cool, and to order him ejected from the airlock. This mock execution 
gambit proves unsuccessful.284 Next, Roslin authorizes Adama’s suggestion of trying an 
experimental hallucinogenic drug on Baltar. Having drugged Baltar, Adama and Roslin 
attempt to extract information from him about the Cylons and his involvement with them. 
But Baltar reveals nothing. The Galactica’s doctor eventually calls off the interrogation 
once Baltar’s vital signs begin to drop precipitously.285 One final attempt to elicit 
information from Baltar is made. Lieutenant Gaeta, who previously served as Baltar’s 
aide on New Caprica, is sent to Baltar to act as a false friend, in the hope that Baltar will 
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let something slip. But on this occasion, the non-coercive approach proves unsuccessful 
as well. After discussing these failures with Adama, Roslin resigns herself to giving 
Baltar a trial.286 
¶85 Adama’s use of the hallucinogenic drug recalls the CIA’s search for a reliable truth 
serum. Beginning in the 1940s, the CIA tested over one hundred and fifty substances to 
determine whether they might be effective for use in interrogation.287  These included 
substances such as coffee, alcohol, morphine, atrophine, heroin, LSD, cocaine, marijuana, 
peyote, and so-called “truth serums” such as sodium amytal and sodium pentothal.288 
Ultimately, the CIA concluded that there was no substance that could consistently cause 
people to tell the truth,289 although the idea that such a substance exists has persisted.290 
Adama’s fictional interrogation drug proves to be no exception. Thus, as with the other 
episodes discussed above, the various coercive techniques in this episode—sleep 
deprivation, mock execution, and the use of an interrogation drug—end up delivering 
nothing of substance.  
2. The Problem of Torture’s Spread 
¶86 The use of torture and coercion spreads in Battlestar Galactica. Initially, torture is 
something that demarcates the boundary between human and Cylon. Humans do not 
torture humans; but Cylons—the mysterious, technologically superior, and apparently 
single-minded enemy—can be tortured, for the very reason that they are not rights-
bearing humans: they are machines.291 But this boundary subsequently proves unstable.  
¶87 The very language the humans use to describe the Cylons emphasizes their non-
human otherness. The standard moniker for a Cylon is a “toaster,” a reference to the 
metallic appearance of earlier Cylon robotic models.292 This point comes through even 
stronger in the episodes discussed above. Leoben Conroy is repeatedly referred to as an 
“it,” which stresses Conroy’s mechanistic otherness.293 Throughout her torture of Leoben, 
Starbuck emphasizes his non-human status. When President Roslin puts a stop to 
Leoben’s torture, Starbuck states the moral calculus at work: “It’s a machine Sir. There’s 
no limit to the tactics I can use.”294 
¶88 Likewise, Cain and crew of the Pegasus consider Cylons, represented by Gina, to 
be subhuman. Once Gina’s betrayal comes to light, a shocked Cain stammers, “Get that 
thing off my bridge.”295 From that point onward, Gina is strictly an “it” or a “thing,”296 
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and can therefore be treated as such by Cylon interrogator Lieutenant Thorne and others. 
Thorne’s subsequent interrogation of Sharon, which Cain has ordered, follows the same 
logic. Employing his usual interrogational modus operandi, Thorne chokes, beats and 
attempts to rape Sharon. He is thwarted and accidentally killed by Helo and Chief Tyrol, 
two members of the Galactica’s crew.297 Colonel Fisk, the executive officer of the 
Pegasus, later rationalises Thorne’s actions and dismisses Helo’s concerns in the same 
way that Starbuck justified her treatment of Leoben: “You can’t rape a machine, 
Lieutenant.”298 
¶89 The dichotomy in treatment between human and Cylon has historical parallels. In 
ancient Greece and Rome, torture was reserved for non-citizen outsiders, namely those 
who were “slaves, barbarians and foreigners.”299 Torture was therefore a mechanism that 
demarcated the citizens from everyone else. In more modern times, public attention and 
concern still seems to be more forthcoming when it is people like us who are being 
subjected to torture. Thus, accounts of the torture of the Mau Mau in Kenya met with 
indifference in Britain and internationally.300 Reports of French torture of Algerians met 
with similar apathy; it was only when French police and military began to torture 
Europeans that there was an international outcry and the beginnings of an anti-torture 
movement.301 After 9/11, torture and its close cousins were also largely reserved for those 
who were perceived as being the other. The fact that they were not like us made it 
permissible to treat them this way.302 The Bush administration’s description of its terrorist 
detainees was carefully chosen to accentuate this. Detainees were referred to as “aliens,” 
“deadly enemies” and “faceless terrorists.”303 This dehumanizing rhetoric relegated them 
to the ranks of the subhuman, increasing the distance between them, the captive terrorist 
suspects, and us.304 Thus, they did not need to be afforded the rights that we have.305 
Indeed, like the (literally) inhuman Cylons of Battlestar Galactica, they did not even need 
to be the subjects of our moral concern.306 
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¶90 However, as noted earlier, one of the difficulties with torture is its tendency to 
spread in spite of attempts to confine it.307 This dynamic is illustrated in Battlestar 
Galactica as torture and other coercive techniques come to be applied to humans as well. 
Gaius Baltar, for example, is subjected to various forms of psychological torture and 
coercion in season 3.308 But the starkest example arises out of the death of the Pegasus’ 
Cylon interrogator, Lieutenant Thorne, in season 2. Having accidentally killed Thorne as 
he was about to sexually assault Sharon, Helo and Chief Tyrol are arrested and taken 
back to the Pegasus, where Admiral Cain’s swiftly convened court-martial sentences both 
to death.309 While they await their fate inside the Pegasus’ brig, Helo and Chief Tyrol are 
confronted by several crewmembers of the Pegasus, who are angry about Thorne’s 
death.310 Helo and Tyrol are overcome and restrained. They are then beaten in the 
stomach with a bar of soap wrapped in a towel, which is, as one of the Pegasus’ 
crewmembers explains, very painful but leaves no marks.311 Colonel Fisk interrupts the 
torture session soon after it begins. Despite his loyalty to Thorne, he reprimands the two 
torturers for assaulting two colonial officers, and for “treating those men like they were 
Cylons.”312 The subtext of Fisk’s statement is simply that there are certain things that can 
be done to Cylons—beatings, whipping, sexual degradation—that cannot be done to 
humans. But in the eyes of the Pegasus’ torturers, this dividing line is not so clear. Once 
one has begun torturing Cylons without compunction, the next logical step is to do the 
same to those who sympathize with them. 
3. Summary 
¶91 In sum, Battlestar Galactica’s account of torture is a skeptical one. Although there 
is no overt moralizing about the evils of torture, the lack of moral certainty about the 
correct course of action in itself provides a pointed contrast to the torture-is-a-no-brainer 
view exemplified by 24. Perhaps most significantly, torture and other coercive 
techniques, as depicted in Battlestar Galactica, are not effective in delivering instant 
truth. If anything, the uses of these techniques are shown to be time consuming, 
ineffective, and corrupting.  
IV. LIFE IMITATES ART 
¶92 The previous two parts of this article have discussed two contrasting narratives of 
torture. Each narrative is reproduced at the level of popular culture by a television show, 
24 and Battlestar Galactica respectively. Both these shows, then, are a reflection of post-
9/11 society, where the use of torture and coercion has been a genuine topic of debate. At 
the same time, as part of popular culture, these shows do not simply reflect different sides 
of the torture debate; they may influence and shape the debate as well. Stuart Croft 
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ascribes considerable significance to popular culture in this regard; because of its 
accessibility and pervasiveness, popular culture is important for reinforcing the discourse 
of the “war on terror” throughout society.313 24 has played this role in relation to the use 
of torture and coercion. Most disturbingly, it has reportedly been the source of inspiration 
for actual interrogation techniques. Battlestar Galactica, representing a rival narrative 
about torture, has not so far achieved the same level of cultural influence as 24. However, 
Battlestar Galactica has achieved a degree of recognition as a television show that deals 
with issues that face societies in times of crisis, including torture, and it has managed to 
transcend the usual boundaries of the science fiction genre. 
A.  The 24 effect  
¶93 The constant repetition of scenes of torture and other coercive techniques in 24 has 
contributed to the audience becoming desensitized to the intentional and graphic 
infliction of pain upon a captive victim.314 Further, 24 has reinforced the view that torture 
and coercion is a necessary and justifiable tool in the grim struggle against terrorism. 
This in turn has likely solidified public apathy and indifference to the use of torture and 
coercion in counter-terrorism.315 Indeed, Scott Horton goes so far as to suggest that 24 
has been created for the very purpose of creating “a more receptive public audience for 
the Bush Administration’s torture policies.”316 Regardless of whether Horton is right 
about this, 24 has certainly achieved such a level of cultural penetration that it is an 
instantly recognizable shorthand for the pro-torture, torture-as-common-sense narrative.  
¶94 24 has been aptly described as the nearest thing to “the Official Cultural Product of 
the War on Terrorism,”317 and has been embraced by some notable people. Senator John 
McCain, despite his public stance against torture, made a brief cameo in season 5 as an 
unnamed member of CTU.318 In 2006, the Heritage Foundation held a forum entitled “24 
and America’s Image in Fighting Terrorism: Fact, Fiction or Does it Matter?” Several 
cast members, producers, Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, and Michael 
Chertoff, at the time the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, attended the 
forum, which was chaired by conservative radio personality Rush Limbaugh.319 In the 
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course of his remarks, Chertoff praised Jack Bauer, and even likened certain aspects of 
the situation faced by the fictional CTU to that faced by the people working under him at 
the Department of Homeland Security.320 
¶95 Further blurring the boundary between entertainment and reality has been the 
invocation of 24 and its hero in the course of debates about interrogation tactics and 
national security policy. This is both an indictment on the level of the debate, and an 
indicator of the show’s penetration into the popular consciousness. For example, 
conservative pundit Laura Ingraham referred to the show’s popularity as being the closest 
approximation to a national referendum on the permissibility of using torture and 
coercion when interrogating high-value al Qaeda detainees.321 Similarly, during a debate 
between Republican presidential candidates in 2007, several presidential hopefuls tried to 
out-tough one another on the issue of torture and interrogation, which was raised—
predictably—in the context of a ticking bomb scenario.322 This itself was indicative of the 
new normality where there was perceived electoral traction in appearing more willing 
than one’s opponents to use the harshest interrogation techniques on a terrorist suspect. 
Later in the debate, Congressman Tom Trancredo, when asked how far he would be 
willing to go in order to deal with a hypothetical terrorist attack, quipped, “I’m looking 
for Jack Bauer at that time, let me tell you.”323 The allusion to 24’s hero not only 
established Tancredo’s pop culture bona fides, but also succinctly expressed his 
willingness to let counter-terrorist agencies do whatever was necessary.324  
¶96 A Canadian judge, during a panel discussion about torture at a legal conference in 
Canada, invoked Jack Bauer in the same manner, but as a negative example. The judge 
remarked, “Thankfully, security agencies in all our countries do not subscribe to the 
mantra ‘What would Jack Bauer do?’”325 This caused Supreme Court Justice Antonin 
Scalia to launch into an impassioned defense of Jack Bauer. Referring to season 2 of 24, 
when Bauer’s tough interrogation tactics save Los Angeles from nuclear incineration, 
Justice Scalia argued that counterterrorism agents, both real and fictional, needed 
maximum latitude to thwart terrorist attacks.326 Subsequently, Justice Scalia invoked the 
same scenario when discussing the issue of torture in an interview with the BBC.327 
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¶97 The Intelligence Science Board’s December 2006 report that addressed the issue of 
torture and interrogation,328 entitled “Educing Information,” was a further exception to 
the valorizing of 24. Referencing the main plotlines of seasons 2 and 3, the Board 
emphasized the unreality of the show’s portrayal of interrogation: 
Prime-time television increasingly offers up plot lines involving the 
incineration of metropolitan Los Angeles by an atomic weapon or its 
depopulation by an aerosol nerve toxin. The characters do not have the 
time to reflect upon, much less to utilize, what real professionals know to 
be the “science and art” of “educing information.” They want results. 
Now. The public thinks the same way. They want, and rightly expect, 
precisely the kind of “protection” that only a skilled intelligence 
professional can provide. Unfortunately, they have no idea how such a 
person is supposed to act “in real life.”329 
That a Supreme Court justice and a report sponsored by government agencies330 should 
reference a television show in discussing the issue of torture and interrogation is 
extraordinary enough, but 24 has had an even more striking effect: the show appears to 
have directly influenced the behavior of actual soldiers and interrogators. In November 
2006, Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, the dean of West Point, met with some of the 
writers and producers of the show, and expressed concern that the show’s message about 
the efficacy and morality of torture was affecting the training of American soldiers.331 
Finnegan observed that he found it increasingly difficult to convince cadets that the 
United States should continue to take the moral high ground, even in the absence of 
reciprocity. He suggested that misconceptions about torture popularized by 24 were 
partly responsible for this.332 Gary Solis, a retired Marine and Judge Advocate who also 
taught at West Point, noted the same phenomenon with his students. When discussing the 
legality and morality of torture, he found that some cadets had adopted Jack Bauer’s 
ethos of being willing to do whatever was necessary to save American lives. Solis had to 
remind them that the show was fictional, and was an inappropriate model for their 
conduct.333 
¶98 24’s co-creator and executive producer, Joel Surnow, who was notably absent from 
the meeting with Finnegan, blithely disclaimed any such consequences caused by his 
show: “Young interrogators don’t need our show. What the human mind can imagine is 
so much greater than what we show on TV. No one needs us to tell them what to do. It’s 
not like somebody goes, ‘Oh, look what they’re doing, I’ll do that.’ Is it?”334 But this 
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appears to be precisely what General Finnegan was complaining of. Moreover, this 
appears to be precisely what occurred at Guantánamo Bay. During meetings held in late 
2002 to discuss new techniques for interrogating Guantánamo detainees, the participants 
drew on various sources of inspiration, including personal experiences, and military 
SERE training.335 According to Diane Beaver, the author of the Beaver memo,336 24 was 
also a fount of ideas: 
The first year of Fox TV’s dramatic series 24 came to a conclusion in 
spring 2002, and the second year of the series began that fall. An 
inescapable message of the program is that torture works. “We saw it on 
cable,” Beaver recalled. “People had already seen the first series. It was 
hugely popular.” Jack Bauer had many friends at Guantánamo, Beaver 
added. “He gave people lots of ideas.” 337 
B.  Battlestar Galactica: Transcending the Science Fiction Genre 
¶99 The re-imagined Battlestar Galactica, unlike its camp 1970s iteration, has received 
critical acclaim.338 Much of this is due to its combination of quality acting, writing and 
production values. Additionally, the show deals with issues that resonate in a post-9/11 
world in a sophisticated manner. In addition to the episodes concerning torture, the show 
has, for example, considered the tension between civilian and military authority, and the 
limits of military necessity. Season 3, as discussed above, considered the morality of 
suicide bombing in the context of resistance to alien/foreign occupation.339 
¶100 The fact that Battlestar Galactica has a political edge that underlies the space 
combat and the story of human survival has resulted in a kind of mainstreaming, as 
indicated by a migration “from the fan boards to political blogs.”340 Thus, Battlestar 
Galactica is now being discussed not simply as a work of science fiction, but as a show 
that has contemporary resonance, and which raises real serious political, moral, and legal 
issues.341 In particular, the show appears to have a certain following amongst legal 
academics. Concurring Opinions, a well-known legal blog, featured an interview with co-
creators Ron Moore and David Eick about various legal and moral issues raised by the 
show.342 Other legal academics have discussed single episodes of Battlestar Galactica that 
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raise legal issues such as the permissibility of genocide343 and the use of military 
commissions.344 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶101 This article has discussed two contrasting narratives about torture. The first is 
centered on the ticking bomb scenario and treats torture and coercion as a necessary tool 
for saving lives. The ticking bomb’s logic has been expounded by various legal 
academics since September 11, and was also evident in various Bush administration 
documents and statements asserting the legality of torture and coercion. The second 
narrative contests the usefulness of the ticking bomb scenario. Other academic 
commentators have pointed out the numerous assumptions underlying the hypothetical 
that are unlikely to be met in practice, as well as the broader costs of employing torture 
and coercion. Certain government actors, notably the FBI and senior military lawyers, 
opposed the use of torture and coercion for similar reasons. 
¶102 These two conflicting accounts of torture have been reproduced in popular culture 
as well. The ticking bomb scenario is at the heart of Fox’s 24, and it justifies Jack 
Bauer’s frequent use of torture. After all, the clock is ticking, catastrophe will ensue 
without heroic intervention, and torture works. Sci-Fi’s Battlestar Galactica by contrast, 
presents a more skeptical view: torture and coercion spreads and corrupts, and above all, 
does not reliably produce results. 
¶103 Despite Jack Bauer fictional nature, he has been invoked in real-world discussions 
about interrogation and national security issues surprisingly often. This is problematic 
because, as argued above, 24’s portrayal of torture and interrogation is unrealistic in 
many significant respects. Somewhat ironically, it is Battlestar Galactica, a science 
fiction show set in outer space, which depicts torture and coercion in a way that is more 
consistent with humanity’s historical experience. The era of the Bush administration has 
of course passed, and President Obama has repudiated some of the most notorious 
excesses of his predecessor’s counterterrorism policies.345 But should the issue of 
interrogational torture and coercion arise again, particularly if the United States should 
suffer a further terrorist attack in the future, rather than just asking what Jack Bauer 
would do, perhaps we might also find wisdom in the words of the equally fictional 
Commander William Adama: “It is not enough to survive; one has to be worthy of 
surviving.”346 
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